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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
0. K. CLAY. Administrator of the 
Estate of ARNOLD KARTCHNER, 
also known as ARNOLD G. KART-
CHNER, also known as ARNOLD 
GRANT KARTCHNER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
STEPHEN L. DUNFORD, PAUL H. 
STEVENS, BURNS L. DUNFORD 
and L. CLAYTON DUNFORD, do-
ing business as THE DUNFORD 
BREAD COMPANY, 
Defendants and Re.rpondents. 
REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 7705 
An examination of the authorities cited by respondent 
reflect substantially those cases where a pedestrian steps sud-
denly into a busy highway without adequate observation as 
to the conditions of traffic. This theory seems to be reflected 
in most of the cases cited in respondents' brief. The theory 
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is clearly stated in the case of DANDO vs. BROBST (Re 
spondents' Brief, Page 31) where it is said: 
"The accident occurred about one o'clock in tht 
afternoon of a dry day, and it is not claimed tha 
plaintiff's vision was in any way. ob~cured. Unde: 
these circumstances, plaintiff muJt meVttably have see1 
the car if she had looked, and if she saw nothing she 
could not have been looking." 
"The duty to look rests at all times upon everyone 
in the use of streets * * * (citations omitted) * * :t 
and when one steps into a busy street and is immedi 
ately struck by a passing vehicle which he would hav1 
seen had he looked, he is barred by his oU'n negligenc1 
* * * (citations omitted) . 
It is apparent that the question which divides counsel ir 
their respective views is that appellant contends that the de 
ceased Kartchner does not have the same duty to look foJ 
approaching traffic as the pedestrian who moves from the 
curb into a busy highway. Thirteenth South is not a bus) 
highway in the sense of many highways where traffic is heavy 
Plaintiff's evidence shows that there was very little traffic a 
the time of the accident. It is a street where automobiles an 
parked on each side of the highway beyond the traveled portior 
of the road. A reference to Page 4 of appellants' brief wil 
give the distances between the traveled portion of the highwaJ 
and the south sidewalk. The hard surfaced portion of the 
highway is approximately the north 40 feet in width anc 
the distance from the north edge of the south sidewalk t< 
the south edge of the traveled portion of the highway i: 
eighteen feet. The deceased had a right to assume that wher 
he was parked in this 18 foot area almost against the nortl 
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edge of the south sidewalk that he was in a position of safety 
insofar as alighting from his automobile. At all events, it 
was not negligent for him to park his automobile where he 
did park it and it was not negligent for him to leave his auto-
mobile from the left hand or north side. The only danger 
to the deceased would be if some motor vehicle should leave 
the main traveled part of the highway and come over into 
the parking area. The deceased ought not to be charged 
with negligence because he failed to see an automobile which 
left the main traveled portion of the highway, came into the 
parking area, and struck the deceased when he was alighting 
from the station wagon approximately one foot north of the 
left side. The respondent takes the position that the duty 
of the deceased man was as great in leaving his automobile 
as if the deceased when leaving it was immediately stepping 
into the line of motor vehicle traffic. We submit that such 
a duty of care ought not to be cast upon one who leaves his 
automobile when it is parked a substantial distance away from 
the portion of the highway and under circumstances where 
the driver could not reasonably anticipate that a motor vehicle 
would leave the traveled portion of the highway and move 
into an area of safety, and it was not the deceased's duty to 
anticipate the negligence of the defendant's truck driver. 
We invite the court's attention to two additional cases, 
KETCHUM v. PATTEE, (Cal.) 98 Pac. 2(d), 1051, and 
STRICKLEN v. ROSEMEYER (Cal.), 142 Pac. 2d 953. 
The Ketchum case is similar in its facts to the case at bar. 
The plaintiff in that case ran out of gas while driving his auto-
mobile on the highway. He testified that he parked his auto-
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mobile in a posttlon on the west shoulder of the highway 
with the edge of the left fenders and running board about 
four inches west of the west lane of the pavement at which 
point the traffic was light. The pavement was flanked on 
each side by shoulders of oiled macadam material with a 
dirt shoulder adjoining. He stepped out of his car to ascertain 
if he was out of gas. He opened the left front door and 
started to back out, and while his left foot was on the running 
board and his right foot on the floor board was struck by an 
on-coming truck. The Supreme Court in passing upon the 
question of plaintiff's contributory negligence used the fol-
lowing language: 
"Appellants next contend that plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence because he left a place of 
compartive safety and entered a place of peril when he 
stepped out of the left door of his automobile without 
taking precaution for his safety, and cite numerous cases 
to sustain this point. However, most of these are cases 
involving city street collisions between automobiles and 
pedestrians in which the plaintiffs actually walked or 
ran in front of oncoming vehicles without first looking. 
The case at bar presents a different factual situation. 
While here is conflicting proof, it is this court's 
duty to view the evidence 'in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiffs, and to see if there is any substantial 
evidence which would take the case to the jury on the 
question of contributory negligence.' Rivera v. Hasen-
jaeger, 29 Cal. App. 2d 431, 432, 85 P. 2d 167. The jury 
may have believed from the evidence that plaintiff was 
not negligent in stopping his automobile on the shoul-
der of the highway, and that he was not yet out of the 
car when the collision occurred, but was partly in the 
car and partly on the running board. There are authori-
ties which hold that it is not negligence per se to ride 
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on a running board. Strong v. Olsen, 74 Cal. App. 518, 
519, 241 P. 107; Yates v. J. H. Krumlinde & Co., 22 Cal. 
App. 2d 387, 391, 71 P. 2d 298. Again, the jury may 
have believed from the photgraph in evidence showing 
the bent brace on the front of the tniCk body, which is 
in some distance from the right front corner of the 
truck bed, that the truck was traveling exceedingly close 
to the parked car and that a reasonable person, situated 
as plaintiff was, would not have anticipated that any 
vehicle would pass close enough to collide with him 
under the circumstances, in view of the proof to the 
effect that there was no north-bound traffic and that 
defendant had. approximately 30 feet of paved highway 
and an additional 7 feet of oiled shoulder east of 
piaintiff's parked car on which to pass. Under the 
circwnstances existing in this case the issue of whether 
or not plaintiff was negligent in stopping his car 
where he did stop it, or in starting to alight from it 
after it was parked, we think, was an issue of fact on 
which reasonable men might differ." 
The principle of law for which the appellant contends, 
we think is well stated in the Stricklen case. In that case 
the plaintiff parked his automobile near the curb in front of 
his home with the left side of the vehicle facing the street. 
While the car was in this position, he opened the left front 
door, put his feet on the running board, and with his head 
and shoulders protruding, looked to the rear and saw a pas-
senger bus approaching which was operated by defendants. 
At that time the bus was only 12 to 20 feet to the rear of 
plaintiff's car and traveling about 15 miles per hour. In this 
situation the plaitniff threw the door of his car farther open and 
prepared to alight. The rear door of the bus had been left 
open while the driver was collecting a fare and the door of 
the bus struck the door of plaintiff's car, injuring the plaintiff. 
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The court gave an instruction that where a person has 
a choice of two ways of performing an act, one of which is 
safe and the other of which he knows ot' in the exercise of 
reasonable care should know is subject to danger, and that 
when such person chooses the dangerous way of performing 
the act and as a direct proximate result thereof is injur~, 
such person is guilty of contributory negligence and is not 
entitled to recover damages from another on account of his 
injuries so received. 
The court further instructed the jury: 
·'The plaintiff, Charles Stricklen, is not to be charged 
with negligence merely because he alighted by the 
northerly door of his automobile. I instruct you that 
the standard of care required of the plaintiff in this 
action is ordinary care as defined in these instructions. 
It is the care an ordinary person of ordinary prudence 
would use under all of the circumstances of the situa-
tion, and if you find that the plaintiff did use ordinary 
care in alighting from his automobile, I instruct you 
that the plaintiff had a right to alight therefrom by 
the northerly door." 
The court in construing these instructions says that the 
:first instruction above set forth was but a generalization of 
a well settled rule, and that its application to the facts of the 
case was carefully tied in by the admonition that the use of 
the left front door was not in itself negligence but that the 
plaintiff "had a right to alight therefrom" and could be charged 
with negligence by reason of the act only if the jury found 
that he had not used "ordinary care as defined in these in-
structions." 
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The case at bar is much stronger in its application to the 
foregoing rule than the Stricklen case because in the Stricklen 
case it appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff did know 
the proximity of the bus to his automobile when he alighted 
therefrom and the instruction itself places the application of 
the safe course rule to situations where the person against 
whom the rule is sought to be enforced knew of the danger 
or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of 
the danger. 
The facts, circumstances, and legal consequences which 
are indicated in the Savas case (Appellants' Brief, Page 20-21) 
seem reasonably· applicable to the case at bar. The deceased 
Kartchner, as in the Savas case, was in a position in the parking 
area where he had a right to be and should have been; at said 
time all the remainder of the road lying north of where the 
deceased parked and left his car was open to the defendants 
and if the driver of defendants' truck had looked ahead as 
was his duty to do, there was nothing to prevent his seeing 
the deceased and his automobile in time to avoid the collision, 
and it was, as said in the Savas case, his duty to so look ahead 
in the exercise of reasonable care. The law presumes under 
the circumstances in this case that the deceased was in the 
exercise of due care, and the burden was on the defendants 
to rebut this presumption. 
Again the language in the Reagan case (Appellants' 
Brief, page 21-22) also seems clearly applicable in the facts 
to the case at bar. There the court said that if there was a 
plainly visible obstruction in the street, a person taking position 
on or immediately in front of it, would be in a position of 
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safety and might be relieved from the duty of observing 
traffic as he would be if he remained on the sidewalk. The 
standing ·automobile was a clearly visible obstruction in the 
course of the on-coming truck. 
Respectfully submitted, 
10 
JOE P. BOSONE 
A.H.HOUGAARD 
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